Marquette Law Review
Volume 93
Issue 4 Summer 2010

Article 43

The Fourth Amendment and the Brave New World
of Online Social Networking
Nathan Petrashek

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
Repository Citation
Nathan Petrashek, The Fourth Amendment and the Brave New World of Online Social Networking, 93 Marq. L. Rev. 1495 (2010).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol93/iss4/43

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE BRAVE
NEW WORLD OF ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORKING
I. INTRODUCTION
New technologies create interesting challenges to long
established legal concepts. Thus, just as when the telephone
gained nationwide use and acceptance . . . and when cellular
telephones came into widespread use, now personal
computers, hooked up to large networks, are so widely used
that the scope of Fourth Amendment core concepts of
―privacy‖ as applied to them must be reexamined.1
During a recent visit to the University of Florida Levin College of Law,
Associate Justice Clarence Thomas was asked whether he believed the Court
has kept pace with rapidly shifting technological changes. According to
Justice Thomas, technological change within the Court was less important
than that occurring on the outside:
[It‘s] changed the way we work, but it‘s also changed some of
the issues. . . . I think you all are in for some interesting
times because there used to be these zones of privacy. . . .
Things were over here in the private sphere and then the
public sphere was over here. Now look how [they‘ve]
merged. You put something on your Facebook, [and] it‘s
there on somebody‘s hard drive forever. . . . We also see it
with respect to how the government can obtain information in
the criminal justice context. [The government doesn‘t]
actually have to come onto property now, to look into your
private affairs. . . . I think you all are in for the brave new
world of technology in a way that we, of course, couldn‘t
have anticipated.2
No phenomenon is more demonstrative of the brave new technological
world than online social networking. Each day, millions of Americans log on
to social networking web sites, whose astonishingly rapid user growth has
turned many into multi-billion-dollar marketing machines. But wholly aside
from their business impact, these web services perform important social
functions by allowing users to meet or remain in touch with others, share
1. United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 410 (C.A.A.F. 1996).
2. Clarence Thomas, Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Address at the University of
Florida Levin College of Law Marshall Criser Distinguished Lecture Series (Feb. 4, 2010).
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ideas, start organizations, and generally contribute to a vibrant and open
society.
Left unstated by Justice Thomas is his notion of how the thorny legal
issues surrounding this new communicative forum should be resolved.
Existing Fourth Amendment doctrine is ill-equipped to handle the
convergence of the public and the private; generally, one loses all privacy
expectations in what is shared with the world.3 Though this tension between
constitutional doctrine and social practice has yet to play out in the courts, it
may soon do so.
With so many individuals sharing so much information, it is no surprise
that social networking services have attracted the attention of both criminals
and police. Social networking sites are frequent targets of sexual predators,
identity thieves, and con artists.4 As a result, police scrutiny of these web
sites has increased, and law enforcement officials are more often using social
networking services as criminal investigation tools.5 This fact creates a
problem of constitutional dimension: how much protection do social
networking users have in their online content?
This Comment evaluates whether social networking users maintain a
reasonable expectation of privacy in their online social networking activity
such that police scrutiny is subject to the Fourth Amendment‘s warrant
requirement. Part II explores the contours of a social networking web site and
describes its operation. This Part considers the origins of the social
networking phenomenon and examines two of the largest social networking
web sites, Facebook and MySpace, in some detail. Part III explains the social
benefits derived from social networking and the risks involved, including the
increasing risk of police surveillance. Part IV describes the current state of
Fourth Amendment search doctrine and explains why it is a poor lens through
which to analyze a user‘s online social networking content. Part V discusses
the consequences should courts refuse to protect online user content. Finally,
Part VI concludes that courts should recognize, in most circumstances, users‘
asserted privacy expectations in their online social networking content.
II. FUNDAMENTALS OF ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORKING
Understanding whether and how the Fourth Amendment regulates police
scrutiny of virtual social networking content requires some attention to the
3. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (―What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection.‖).
4. Terrence Berg, The Changing Face of Cybercrime: New Interest Threats Create Challenges
to Law Enforcement, MICH. B.J., June 2007, at 18, 18–19 (2007).
5. Id. at 18.
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fundamental characteristics of that medium. Fourth Amendment protection
often depends upon the type of information obtained, the method of its
collection, and the location from which it is seized.6 It is therefore necessary
to sketch out the core attributes of an online social network—what it is, who
uses it, and how it functions. These defining characteristics are all relevant
when determining whether police activity constitutes a ―search.‖
Such a comprehensive review is no easy task. Social networking web
sites are novel communication tools whose dynamics are not yet well
understood (or firmly established). Indeed, because their business models
require them to capture and hold the attention of a fast-paced society, social
networking web sites are among the most prone to anticipate ―the way the
world is moving.‖7 Users of these rapidly changing instruments have little
choice but to go along for the ride.8 In addition, the fluid nature of the
Internet guarantees that, on any given day, any number of social networking
web sites might pop into creation or wink out of existence. A truly
comprehensive review of the social networking phenomenon is therefore
impossible.
This Part‘s goals are more modest. The first is to define the
communication tools to which this Comment‘s analysis applies. Second, a
brief discussion of online social networking‘s origins demonstrates the
novelty of the medium and its potential for future growth. Finally, this Part
will provide a practical look at two well-established social networking sites,
MySpace and Facebook.
A. Defining an Online Social Network
No discernable consensus exists with respect to the definition of online

6. See Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503,
508–09, 512–13 (2007).
7. Alexei Oreskovic, Facebook Privacy Revamp Draws Fire, Reuters (Dec. 10, 2009),
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5B82F320091210 (quoting Facebook spokesman Barry
Schnitt).
8. One popular social networking web site, for example, recently adopted broad changes to its
privacy policy. The effect was to turn what was previously considered a private social network into a
much more public forum. Jason Kincaid, The Facebook Privacy Fiasco Begins, TechCrunch (Dec. 9,
2009), http://www.techcrunch.com/2009/12/09/facebook-privacy. But see Riva Richmond, A Guide
to
Facebook‘s
New
Privacy
Settings,
Gadgetwise,
http://gadgetwise.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/27/5-steps-to-reset-your-facebook-privacysettings/?scp=2&sq=facebook%20privacy&st=cse (May 27, 2010, 16:41 EST) (describing
subsequent changes to Facebook‘s privacy policy scaling back the types of user data considered
public). Users are generally powerless to prevent these changes unless they object in truly significant
numbers. See Brad Stone & Brian Stelter, Facebook Backtracks on Use Terms, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19,
2009, at B1 (describing Facebook‘s retraction of a modified user contract following objections from
tens of thousands of members accompanied by bloggers and advocacy groups).
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social networking.9 At least one court has ventured into the morass and
offered a starting point:
[A] ―social networking web site‖ . . . allows its members to
create online ―profiles,‖ which are individual web pages on
which members post photographs, videos, and information
about their lives and interests. The idea of online social
networking is that members will use their online profiles to
become part of an online community of people with common
interests.10
While the court‘s definition is a useful one to build upon, by itself it is
insufficient. While some social networking communities previously consisted
only of members with some common affiliation—attendance at a particular
university or college, for example—this is increasingly uncommon. Many
virtual communities include individuals with whom a user has no shared life
experience or interests. Facebook‘s recent abandonment of a classification
system grouping members according to their educational institution or
geographic location reflects this reality.11 The court‘s definition also provides
an incomplete description of the activities of social networking users and
ignores the nuanced process by which users create their virtual communities.
For all its faults, the court‘s definition does accurately identify the principal
function of online social networking: to allow members to connect to a broad
virtual community via a personal profile.12 Most social networking web sites
are built, to varying degrees, around two basic elements: the ―profile‖ and the
―community.‖13
9. Cydney Tune & Marley Degner, Blogging and Social Networking: Current Legal Issues, in
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY LAW INSTITUTE 2008: NEW DIRECTIONS: SOCIAL NETWORKS, BLOGS,
PRIVACY, MASH-UPS, VIRTUAL WORLDS & OPEN SOURCE 7–8 (2008) (―[S]ocial networking sites
lack a clear definition, and courts that have tackled the task of defining them have either relied on
dictionary definitions or have used general or vague definitions.‖).
10. Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 845–46 (W.D. Tex. 2007). On appeal, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals provided a shorter definition, stating that ―[o]nline social networking
is the practice of using a Web site or other interactive computer service to expand one‘s business or
social network.‖ Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 415 (5th Cir. 2008), aff’g Doe v. MySpace,
Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843 (W.D. Tex. 2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 600 (2008).
11. Matthew J. Hodge, Comment, The Fourth Amendment and Privacy Issues on the “New”
Internet: Facebook.com and MySpace.com, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 95, 97–98 (2006). Definitions
proposed by commentators can also fall into this trap. See, e.g., John S. Wilson, Comment,
MySpace, Your Space, or Our Space? New Frontiers in Electronic Evidence, 86 OR. L. REV. 1201,
1204 (2007) (defining ―social-networking sites‖ as ―interactive web sites that connect users based on
common interests and that allow subscribers to personalize individual web sites‖).
12. Doe, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 845–46.
13. Richard M. Guo, Note, Stranger Danger and the Online Social Network, 23 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 617, 620 (2008); cf. Patricia Sanchez Abril, A (My)Space of One’s Own: On Privacy and
Online Social Networks, 6 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 73, 74 (2007) (noting the ―self-invention
within a perceived community‖ that online social networking facilitates).
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Generally, a person is required to create a profile when registering for a
social networking web site. Profile creation is accomplished by filling out a
series of virtual forms eliciting a broad range of personal data. The
information requested varies depending upon the particular web site, but users
are commonly asked to provide their name, home address, e-mail address,
age, sex, location, and birth date.14 The web site populates the user‘s profile
with the supplied information and allows a user to ―aggregate and present her
personal information, photos, web journals, favorite hyperlinks, and the like‖
into one web page.15 The populated profile becomes ―a multimedia collage
that serves as one‘s digital ‗face‘ in cyberspace using images, video, audio,
and links to other profiles and websites.‖16
Profile creation allows the member to participate in the community
element of social networking sites. Users establish virtual communities by
linking their profiles in a process known as ―friending‖ or ―connecting.‖17
One user requests to add another as a friend, and the recipient may either
accept or reject the invitation.18 If the recipient accepts, the profiles are linked
and the connected members are generally able to view one another‘s online
content without restriction.19 The network created by the linking process
allows a user to chat with friends,20 display support for particular causes, ―join

14. See Guo, supra note 13, at 619–20.
15. Id. at 619.
16. Abril, supra note 13, at 74. The fact that a user profile is entirely self-generated can lead to
significant mischief and presents an interesting conundrum for law enforcement: a person observing
the online profile of a user with whom the observer is unacquainted has no idea whether the profile is
legitimate. In fact, the user may be entirely fictitious. See Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist.,
No. 3:07cv585, 2008 WL 4279517, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2008) (student created false Internet
profile purporting to be her school principal); see also Samantha L. Millier, Note, The Facebook
Frontier: Responding to the Changing Face of Privacy on the Internet, 97 KY. L.J. 541, 542 (2009)
(discussing the case of Freddi Staur, a toy frog with a Facebook account).
17. See Guo, supra note 13, at 620.
18. Social networking users may face external limitations on the types of individuals they may
virtually befriend. Florida‘s Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee recently recommended judges
refrain from friending lawyers, fearing the act would create the appearance of impropriety. John
Schwartz, For Judges on Facebook, Friendship Has Limits, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2009, at A25. A
minority of the panel concluded that ―social networking sites have become so ubiquitous that the
term ‗friend‘ on these pages does not convey the same meaning that it did in the pre-internet age.‖
Fla. Sup. Ct. Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Advisory Op. 2009-20 (2009),
http://www.jud6.org/LegalCommunity/LegalPractice/opinions/jeacopinions/2009/2009-20.html
(discussing whether a judge may post messages and other information on her social networking site).
19. This is not universally the case. Some websites feature person-specific privacy settings that allow
a user to restrict a particular individual‘s ability to access her online content. On Facebook, for example,
users retain this ability even if the target of the restrictions is a virtual friend. See Facebook.com,
Facebook‘s Privacy Policy § 3, http://www.facebook.com/policy.php (last visited May 8, 2010).
20. Some social networking web sites permit only private messages, while others allow users to
post public messages to another‘s profile.
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interest groups dedicated to virtually any topic,‖ and otherwise ―hang out.‖21
Social networking web sites allow users to virtually hang out by
encouraging self-disclosure.22 There exists a direct relationship between the
growth of a user‘s profile and growth of her online community. The more
information the user supplies, the greater her ability to connect with others.
Web sites therefore will commonly question members about their interests,
favorite groups or organizations, work history, education, relationship status,
and preferences.23 Self-disclosure also directly benefits the web site, which
uses targeted marketing to generate revenue.24
An online social network can therefore be defined as an online service that
encourages self-disclosure by requiring members to populate a profile with
personal information and allows them to create a virtual community by
linking their personal profile with those of other members.25 Most of the
hundred million or so web sites on the Internet will fall outside this definition,
and perhaps police surveillance of those sites is less objectionable.26
However, the number of web sites falling within this definition is sure to
increase as more sites adopt similar principles in an attempt to replicate the
success of social networking services.27 The creation and rapid expansion of
online social networking over the past decade makes this evident.
B. Development of Online Social Networking
Online social networking rose from the ashes of the dot-com bubble burst
of 2001 that left many web-based businesses in shambles.28 Scholars dubbed

21. Abril, supra note 13, at 74.
22. Id.
23. See Hodge, supra note 11, at 97; cf. Abril, supra note 13, at 74 (describing online social
networks as ―[a] high tech cross between a bumper sticker and a diary‖).
24. Kermit Pattison, How to Market Your Business with Facebook, N.Y. Times on the Web (Nov.
12, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/12/business/smallbusiness/12guide.html.
MySpace‘s
privacy policy offers a good example: ―[B]ased on your music interests we might display an
advertisement to make sure you are advised when your favorite band is coming to town.‖
MySpace.com, Privacy Policy, http://www.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=misc.privacy (last
visited May 8, 2010).
25. Personal information in this sense is broader than the definition provided in statutes
prohibiting identity theft, and includes references to a person‘s interests and activities. See, e.g.,
WIS. STAT. § 943.201(1)(b) (2007–2008).
26. For example, in United States v. Gines-Perez, 214 F. Supp. 2d 205, 225–26 (D.P.R. 2002),
the district court concluded no expectation of privacy was violated when police downloaded ―a
commercial photograph [of the defendant], placed on [an] under-construction web page, for obvious
commercial, marketing purposes.‖
27. Gary Rivlin, Wallflower at the Web Party, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2006, § 3, at 1 (―Roughly
once a week, David L. Sze, a venture capitalist at Greylock Partners, hears from entrepreneurs who
say they have the next MySpace . . . .‖)
28. Guo, supra note 13, at 618.
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the new web services growing out of that collapse ―Web 2.0.‖29 The earliest
social networking web site, Friendster, was created in 2002 and offered users
―a site where they could browse profiles posted by friends and the friends of
friends in search of dates and playmates.‖30 Friendster was a trailblazer, but
also a complete disaster; as of 2006, Friendster was one of the least popular
social networking websites, trailing behind a site started in 2005 by a 16-yearold high school student.31
Despite the lackluster success of Friendster, online social networking has
flourished. The years 2003 and 2004 marked the respective births of the two
most popular social networking services, MySpace and Facebook.32 Since
their debut, they have attracted hundreds of millions of users33 and their
values have skyrocketed as advertisers realized the marketing potential of this
new communicative forum.34 Less than a decade after their creation, social
networking websites have truly become the ―soda fountains‖ of the twentyfirst century, where ―members of a community . . . gather . . . to ‗chew the
fat‘—discuss matters of local politics, share the latest gossip, or complain
about the weather.‖35
C. Social Networking Behemoths: MySpace and Facebook
While countless web sites have attempted to cash in on
networking phenomenon, two services merit particular attention
their vast member base and high visibility. Each day hundreds of
users connect to one another using the services of Internet

the social
because of
millions of
behemoths

29. Id. at 618–19. Guo articulates seven principles that allow one to identify a creature of Web
2.0 origin: (1) ―Services, not packaged software, with cost-effective scalability‖; (2) ―Control over
unique, hard-to-recreate data sources that get richer as more people use them‖; (3) ―Trusting users as
co-developers‖; (4) ―Harnessing collective intelligence‖; (5) ―Leveraging the long tail through
customer self-service‖; (6) ―Software above the level of a single device‖; and (7) ―Lightweight user
interfaces, development models, AND business models.‖ Id. at 619 (citing Tim O‘Reilly, What Is
Web 2.0? Design Patterns and Business Models for the Next Generation of Software, O‘Reilly (Sept.
30, 2005), http://www.oreillynet.com/pub/a/oreilly/tim/news/2005/09/30/what-is-web-20.html). Guo
concludes online social networks are creatures of Web 2.0 because they embrace the second, third,
and fourth principles. Id.
30. Rivlin, supra note 27. By 2002, Google had already offered to buy out Friendster for $30
million. Id.
31. Id.
32. Wilson, supra note 11, at 1221–22.
33. Facebook alone has a membership roughly equal to the population of the United States.
Shannon Awsumb, Social Networking Sites: The Next E-Discovery Frontier, BENCH & BAR OF
MINNESOTA, Nov. 2009, at 22, 22, available at http://www2.mnbar.org/benchandbar/2009/nov09/
networking.html. Its expansion has been rapid. MySpace and Facebook had a collective
membership of only 175 million users as of 2008. Guo, supra note 13, at 620–21.
34. In January 2008, investors valued Facebook at over $15 billion. Connections Are His
Currency, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2008, at C3.
35. Wilson, supra note 11, at 1219–20.
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MySpace and Facebook. Not surprisingly, these web sites are among those
most frequently targeted by police to detect criminal activity.36 Differing
privacy functions, user controls, and even guiding philosophies mandate the
two services receive individual attention.37
1. MySpace
Since its creation in 2003, MySpace has quickly grown to one of the most
frequently visited web sites on the Internet.38 While its corporate history
remains controversial even seven years later,39 the web site‘s huge marketing
audience has dramatically increased its value; MySpace cost Rupert
Murdoch‘s News Corporation $580 million when it purchased MySpace in
2005, and it remains under News Corporation ownership today.40 Although
MySpace‘s growth remained steady throughout 2006 and 2007, the web site
has since yielded its position as the most popular social networking site to
chief rival Facebook.41 As of January 2008, 110 million active users were
regularly accessing the web site, and it was growing at an average rate of
300,000 new users per day.42 In America, one in four citizens has a MySpace
page, and MySpace is the most visited site on the Internet.43 One
commentator has compellingly characterized this growth: ―If MySpace alone
were a country and each of its profiles a person, it would be the [twelfth] most
populous nation in the world.‖44
A MySpace profile is an amalgamation of mandatory registration
information and optional non-personally identifiable information. MySpace‘s
success can be attributed in part to the absence of restrictive membership
criteria; to join, a potential MySpace member need only be at least fourteen
years old and have Internet access and an e-mail account.45 Other information

36. See Berg, supra note 4, at 18–19.
37. See Catherine Dwyer et al., Trust and Privacy Concern Within Social Networking Sites: A
Comparison of Facebook and MySpace, Proceedings of the Thirteenth Americas Conference on
Information Systems (Aug. 9–12, 2007) (comparing the web sites).
38. See Karen Barth Menzies, Perils and Possibilities of Online Social Networks, TRIAL, July
2008, at 58.
39. Wilson, supra note 11, at 1222–23. The company claims that two friends, Tom Anderson
and Chris DeWolfe, took earlier social networking service concepts and expanded upon them, while
others claim MySpace was populated by what amounted to a massive spam mail campaign. Id.
40. Id. at 1223.
41. Shira Ovide & Nick Wingfield, MySpace Ads Up for Grabs, WALL ST. J., July 6, 2010, at
B1 (measuring popularity by number of unique visitors worldwide); Brian Stelter & Tim Arango,
Losing Popularity Contest, MySpace Tries a Makeover, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2009, at B3.
42. Menzies, supra note 38, at 58.
43. Id.
44. Abril, supra note 13, at 74.
45. See id.; Guo, supra note 13, at 621.
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collected at registration includes the user‘s full name and gender.46 MySpace
members may also choose to store and display non-personally identifiable
information on their profiles.47 When creating a profile, the user is asked to
fill out ―several information sections, known as ‗blurbs.‘‖48 The two standard
sections are titled ―About Me‖ and ―Who I‘d Like to Meet,‖49 but MySpace
profiles also store a user‘s interests, hobbies, lifestyle choices, groups with
whom they are affiliated (schools, companies), videos and pictures, private
messages, bulletins, or personal statements.50 There are limits on what users
may post: MySpace‘s Terms of Use supply a lengthy list of prohibited profile
content, including that which ―furthers or promotes any criminal activity.‖51
Users may change their registration or profile information at any time.52
MySpace permits users to connect with one another in many ways. The
court in Doe v. MySpace, Inc. thoroughly chronicled MySpace‘s community
element, documenting the interaction process:
Once a profile has been created, the member can use it to
extend ―invitations‖ to existing friends who are also
MySpace.com users and to communicate with those friends
online by linking to their profiles, or using e-mail, instant
messaging, and blogs, all of which are hosted through the
MySpace.com platform.
Members can also meet new people at MySpace.com
through user groups focused on common interests such as
film, travel, music, or politics. . . . MySpace.com members
can also become online ―friends‖ with celebrities, musicians,
or politicians who have created MySpace.com profiles to
publicize their work and to interface with fans and
supporters.53
In addition, members may interact using third-party applications, like games,

46. MySpace.com, Privacy Policy, supra note 24. MySpace is also permitted to collect a user‘s
telephone number, mailing address, and credit card number upon registration, but does not actively
do so at this time. Id.
47. Id.
48. Guo, supra note 13, at 621.
49. Id.
50. See generally MySpace.com, Terms & Conditions, http://www.myspace.com/
index.cfm?fuseaction=misc.terms (last visited May 8, 2010). Profile information provided in
structured profile fields or questions, or information added to open-ended profile fields and
questions, ―may . . . be used to customize the online ads [users] encounter to those [MySpace]
believe[s] are aligned with [the user‘s] interests.‖ MySpace.com, Privacy Policy, supra note 24.
51. MySpace.com, Terms & Conditions, supra note 50, § 8.11.
52. MySpace.com, Privacy Policy, supra note 24.
53. Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 415–16 (5th Cir. 2008) (footnote omitted).
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on the MySpace platform.54
MySpace users can, within limits, determine the extent to which their
profile content is accessible to others.55 MySpace profiles are public by
default, with certain limited exceptions.56 A profile, once created, is instantly
viewable to any Internet user, without notice to its creator.57 Certain
information (e.g., a user‘s name and photograph) will always remain public,
but access to other profile content may be restricted to certain groups of
users.58 Any profile content that remains public may be indexed by search
engines.59 In addition, MySpace may share profile content with companies
using the service for advertising or marketing.60 MySpace disclaims
ownership rights in profile content, but reserves the right to use or reproduce
content.61
A search function allows MySpace users to locate other users‘ profiles.62
MySpace‘s privacy policy describes the web site‘s search capabilities:
In order to locate other MySpace Members that you may
already know in the physical world, MySpace allows Users to
search for Members using Registration PII [personally
identifiable information] (i.e., full name or email address).
MySpace also allows Users to browse for certain Profile
Information in order to help connect with Members (i.e.,
schools and/or companies where Users may have attended or
worked).63
Each search yields up to 3,000 profile links, ordered by the searcher‘s
choice of newest profiles, recently updated profiles, most recent log-in, or
distance from a specified zip code.64
Results can change almost
instantaneously depending upon the search criteria. Once a profile shows up

54. MySpace.com, Privacy Policy, supra note 24. The policy defines third-party applications
as ―small bits of software, often with interactivity, that can be installed into Members‘ profiles or
shared with other Users.‖ Id.
55. A.B. v. State, 885 N.E.2d 1223, 1224 (Ind. 2008).
56. Guo, supra note 13, at 621–22. One exception is for teenagers: although ―[p]rior to 2008,
users who were fourteen or fifteen had their profiles automatically restricted to their friends,‖
MySpace recently changed this policy and raised the age to eighteen. Id.
57. See id. at 620.
58. A.B., 885 N.E.2d at 1224 (citing MySpace.com, Privacy Policy, Mar. 31, 2008).
59. MySpace.com, Privacy Policy, supra note 24.
60. Id.
61. MySpace.com, Terms & Conditions, supra note 50, § 6.1.
62. Megan A. Moreno et al., Reducing At-Risk Adolescents’ Display of Risk Behavior on a
Social Networking Web Site, 163 ARCH. PEDIATR. ADOLESC. MED. 35, 36 (2009).
63. MySpace.com, Privacy Policy, supra note 24.
64. Megan A. Moreno et al., Display of Health Risk Behaviors on MySpace by Adolescents,
163 ARCH. PEDIATR. ADOLESC. MED. 27, 28 (2009).
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in the results list, simply clicking on it will bring up the user‘s profile.65 If the
user has not modified her privacy settings, all profile content will be
accessible to the searcher.
2. Facebook
Facebook quietly entered the social networking scene in 2004 when Mark
Zuckerberg, then an undergraduate student at Harvard, sought to
electronically emulate the paper facebooks distributed to incoming students
and staff.66 The web site spread from the Harvard dorms to other Ivy League
institutions, then to other universities. During the web site‘s early stages, only
college students with an e-mail address assigned by a university could use the
service.67 As a result, Facebook experienced markedly slower user growth
than MySpace.68 These restrictions were motivated by Facebook‘s desire to
enhance the user‘s ―‗interaction with [his] real friends, based on real
relationships and the real world around them.‘‖69 The success of its more
popular competitor quickly convinced Facebook to abandon this philosophy;
by 2006, anyone at least thirteen years old with a valid e-mail address could
create a profile.70
Facebook allows users to build a profile in much the same way as
MySpace. Facebook prompts new users to supply their name, e-mail address,
sex, and birth date. Perhaps as a vestige of Facebook‘s restrictive roots, users
are also asked to name any high schools, colleges, or universities attended.
Users may build upon this foundation by supplying additional information in
any of four sections that compose the profile: ―Basic Information,‖ which
includes the user‘s current city, hometown, relationship status, and political
and religious views; ―Personal Information,‖ which includes interests,
activities, and favorite music, movies, and books; ―Contact Information,‖

65. Id.
66. Wilson, supra note 11, at 1221; Millier, supra note 16, at 541–42. Facebook‘s origin is not
without controversy either.
Fellow Harvard undergraduates Tyler Winklevoss, Cameron
Winklevoss, and Divya Narendra filed suit against Zuckerberg, arguing that they had come up with
the idea for a similar social networking web site and hired Zuckerberg to help them write code for it.
ConnectU LLC v. Zuckerberg, 522 F.3d 82, 86 (1st Cir. 2008). According to their history,
Zuckerberg ―not only failed to carry out the assignment but also stole their idea, business plan, and
rudimentary (unfinished) source code in order to launch a competing social networking website.‖ Id.
67. Guo, supra note 13, at 622.
68. Id.
69. Id. (quoting the posting of Donna Bogatin to Digital Markets, Facebook Talks ―The Real
Deal‖ in Exclusive Interview, http://blogs.zdnet.com/micro-markets/?p=533 (Oct. 12, 2006, 08:27
CDT)). This social networking business model is known as the ―confirmed friendship‖ model. Guo,
supra note 13, at 622. By contrast, MySpace has been criticized for encouraging long friend lists, a
model that technology entrepreneur Christopher Allen argues eschews quality for quantity. Marcia
Clemmitt, Cyber Socializing, 16 C.Q. RESEARCHER 627, 636 (2006).
70. Guo, supra note 13, at 622.
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which includes web sites, addresses, phone numbers, and instant messaging
screen names; and ―Education and Work,‖ which is largely self-descriptive.
―Status‖ posts allow users to update their profiles with up-to-the-minute
information, offering users a virtual soapbox to their online community. 71
Facebook‘s community element is perhaps more sophisticated than that of
MySpace. The web site‘s design makes it easy for users to ―compile lists of
their friends, post public comments on friends‘ profiles, . . . send private
messages to other users[,] . . . [and] create groups of people with similar
interests. . . .‖72 Members may upload photographs, and both Facebook and
MySpace allow users to ―tag‖ their friends in the image. Tagging ―creates a
link [in] the individual‘s profile from the photograph, making users easily
identifiable, even when the viewer of the photograph is not ‗friends‘ with the
photograph‘s subjects.‖73 Facebook‘s user interface sports a search function
similar to MySpace‘s.74 New features are often introduced, and users have
greater opportunities to showcase their preferences and activities with thirdparty applications built into the Facebook platform.75
Facebook offers users an advanced series of privacy settings to restrict
others‘ ability to access their profile content. Users can control the visibility
of nearly all the information shared through Facebook, including their
interests and activities, family and relationships, education and work, and
status updates and comments.76 Nonetheless, a user‘s perceived ability to
maintain control over her online information is largely illusory, as that
information ―may remain viewable elsewhere to the extent it has been shared
with others‖—even if the user removes the information from her profile or
deletes her account.77 Moreover, Facebook has deemed certain information—
including a user‘s name, profile photograph, gender, geographic region, and
networks—―publicly available,‖ and as a result these categories lack a privacy
setting.78 In addition, some information cannot be deleted by the user at all.79
Facebook‘s abandonment of the ―confirmed friendship‖ model—in which
71. Millier, supra note 16, at 542.
72. Hodge, supra note 11, at 97.
73. Millier, supra note 16, at 544.
74. See Hodge, supra note 11, at 97.
75. Users have the option to add hundreds of third-party applications designed for Facebook.
See Facebook.com, Application Directory, http://www.facebook.com/apps/directory.php (last visited
May 8, 2010). The use of third-party applications carries additional privacy risks, as their
compliance with Facebook‘s usage terms is apparently determined entirely by the applications‘
developers.
See Facebook.com, Statement of Rights and Responsibilities § 9,
http://www.facebook.com/terms.php (last visited May 8, 2010).
76. Facebook.com, Facebook‘s Privacy Policy, supra note 19, § 3.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. Messages between users are one such category of information. Id.
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the web site ―group[ed] users into networks based on affiliation with a
university, high school, region of the country, or company, and . . . allow[ed]
other users within a network to view each others‘ profiles‖80—has led to
sweeping, but criticized,81 changes to its privacy policy. The changes, which
are designed to make user content more public, are an effort to compete with
social networking up-and-comer Twitter, a web site allowing users to share
140-character messages with one another in real time from nearly anywhere
on the planet. The major change is a default privacy setting for certain
information:
Information set to ―everyone‖ is publicly available
information . . . [and] may be accessed by everyone on the
Internet (including people not logged into Facebook), be
indexed by third party search engines . . . and may also be
associated with you . . . even outside of Facebook. . . . The
default privacy setting for certain types of information you
post on Facebook is set to ―everyone.‖82
Facebook has experienced steady user growth, adding new members at a
rate of 200,000 per day.83 These additions supplement the nearly 300 million
active users who already utilize Facebook‘s services. With ―55,000 regional,
work-related, collegiate, and high school networks,‖84 Facebook is bound to
remain one of the most popular social networking web sites well into the
foreseeable future.
III. THE ATTRACTION OF ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORKING TO USERS AND
LAW ENFORCEMENT
As the uses of technology become more intrusive, claims of
personal privacy will grow in importance. As the methods of
criminal enterprises become more sophisticated, the needs of
law enforcement in combatting them will also grow.85
The creation and rapid growth of online social networking prompts the
question: What makes it so appealing? People are flocking to social
networking web sites and disclosing more information than ever using these
services.86 While generally this type of information-sharing produces social
80. Hodge, supra note 11, at 98.
81. Oreskovic, supra note 7.
82. Facebook.com, Facebook‘s Privacy Policy, supra note 19, § 3.
83. Guo, supra note 13, at 622.
84. Wilson, supra note 11, at 1222.
85. United States v. McNulty (In re Steven M. Askin), 47 F.3d 100, 105 (4th Cir. 1995).
86. In a recent study, 100% of Facebook users revealed their real name and 94% disclosed their
e-mail address. Dwyer, supra note 37. While these percentages were much lower for MySpace users
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good, certain disclosures encourage illegal activity, and excessive disclosure
attracts an undesirable criminal element. Criminal utilization of online social
networking, in turn, attracts law enforcement. This mixture of excessive
disclosure, criminals, and police is certain to produce frequent constitutional
issues in the near future.
A. Benefits of Online Social Networking
Richard Guo has identified at least two specific benefits resulting from the
use of social networking media. First, use of social networking media
encourages self-expression and socialization in a way in-person interaction
might not.87 Social networking web sites contribute to this development by
providing a virtual forum for peer interaction that helps users understand the
contours of (and, one would hope, establish) healthy relationships.88 Although
this opportunity to enhance one‘s personal identity may benefit all users, the
growth is most perceptible in younger social networking members.89
A second primary benefit of online social networking participation is the
ability to stay connected with others even when separated by vast
geographical distance.90 This connectivity permits family and friends to
remain close and keep informed on events in each other‘s lives. While a user
benefits from this ―surveillance‖ function through a better understanding of
the other member‘s life, the monitored member might also benefit when the
monitoring member recognizes antisocial behavior and intervenes.91
Another substantial advantage of social networking participation is the
ability to meet new people virtually. This connection may occur as a result of
a user‘s searches, or may result from the user‘s interaction with existing
online friends or membership in an online group. Whatever the cause, many
users now utilize social networking web sites to make new friends or
professional connections.92
(66.7% and 40%, respectively), MySpace members were significantly more likely to reveal other
information, such as relationship status. Id.
87. See Guo, supra note 13, at 624.
88. Id.
89. Id. This benefit may be particularly important, as ―[v]arious sources cite MySpace user
demographics to be predominantly between the ages of fourteen and thirty-four, with thirty-four
being considered a high estimate due to people altering their ages to skew higher in some cases to
mask their true age or to be humorous.‖ A.B. v. State, 885 N.E.2d 1223, 1224–25 (Ind. 2008). This
is not to say that online social networking is a young person‘s game: ―As of January 2008, the
fastest-growing demographic among Facebook users was people older than 24.‖ Menzies, supra note
38, at 58–59.
90. Guo, supra note 13, at 624–25.
91. Cliff Lampe et al., A Face(book) in the Crowd: Social Searching vs. Social Browsing,
Proceedings of the Twentieth Anniversary Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work
(Nov. 4–8, 2006).
92. LinkedIn.com, for example, is a social networking web site designed to facilitate

1508

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[93:1495

These advantages suggest an increasing segment of the population will
utilize online social networking services. As the web sites expand feature sets
and improve user interaction, their appeal to otherwise resistant individuals
will grow.93 This growth, in turn, suggests even greater amounts of personal
information will soon be available to other users—both those with benign and
criminal intentions.
B. The Utility of Online Social Networking to Law Enforcement
Two problems are immediately visible with respect to the increasing
disclosure of personal information. First, as the amount of personal
information disclosed on online social networks increases, so does the
probability that it will reveal users engaged in illegal or high-risk behavior.
High-risk behavior can include alcohol or drug abuse, sexual conduct, and
violence.94 A recent study concluded that over half of the sampled profiles of
eighteen-year-old MySpace users displayed one or more of these risk
behaviors.95 Although the most common risk behavior was alcohol use, users
also frequently described sexual activities.96 Because users can easily connect
with others who have similar interests, users can display or model risk
behaviors and thus make such conduct (and its disclosure) the norm.97
The second problem associated with increased disclosures on online social
networks is the risk that a greater number of criminals will utilize these web
sites for nefarious ends. U.S. Attorney Terrence Berg commendably describes
this effect in his 2007 article ―The Changing Face of Cybercrime‖:
With millions of users packing these sites with personal
information of every type, from family photos and movies to
career interests to what used to pass for private gossip among
close friends, these sites are gargantuan warehouses of
valuable personal identity, consumer preference, personality
and family issues, and online usage/habit information that
could be exploited if made accessible to those with criminal
ends in mind. They are a treasure trove for the Internet child

professional networking.
93. An older group of ―digital immigrants‖ has somewhat cautiously migrated to the digital
medium, but has not been as receptive as the younger group of ―digital natives‖ who have been
―raised in an Internet-immersed culture[ and] are extremely cyber-savvy.‖ Abril, supra note 13, at
76–77.
94. See Moreno et al., supra note 64, at 27–28.
95. Id. at 30. This result is consistent with an earlier study that concluded that ―approximately
47% of 16- and 17-year-olds displayed references to risk behaviors of sexual activity and substance
use on MySpace public profiles.‖ Id. at 31.
96. Id. at 30.
97. See id. at 31.

2010]

BRAVE NEW WORLD

1509

predator or ID thief.98
The threats identified by Berg—child sexual predation and ID theft—
underscore the risks inherent in the voluntary disclosure of extensive personal
information to online ―friends.‖ Although more traditional Internet forums
(e.g., chat rooms) are susceptible to child solicitation, this problem is
especially pronounced in online social networks because they ―promote
sharing a vast amount of personal information divulged on a user‘s MySpace
or Facebook page and engender a feeling of trust among ‗friends‘ in the social
network.‖99 ―MySpace has already been the forum for some celebrated cases
of child solicitation,‖ and social networking web sites‘ aggregation of
information ―presents a target-rich environment for those seeking to steal data,
and runs the risk that viruses or worms intended either to collect data or
damage systems will have devastating multiplier effects because so many
users are interlinked.‖100
There is already significant evidence that authorities have begun to use
online social networks to keep tabs on individuals within their jurisdiction.
―[P]oint-and-click‖ police are increasingly turning to online communities to
aid in their investigations.101 In 2006, for example, police arrested a sixteenyear-old and charged him with juvenile possession of a handgun after officers
discovered MySpace pictures of him holding the weapons.102 Indeed,
inculpatory user photographs appear to have the most utility to law
enforcement officials.103 Law enforcement organizations make it clear that
they endorse the practice: ―‗It really does behoove police departments to
really be technically proficient on computers, and that includes social
networking sites as well, because that‘s a very popular way for youth to
98. Berg, supra note 4, at 19.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 19–20.
101. Wilson, supra note 11, at 1224. Some police are forthright about their use of online social
networking sites: ―‗If I have a slower assignment, or [ten] minutes at the beginning of my shift, I use
a series of [twenty] different searches,‘‖ confessed one University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee police
officer who uses Facebook to ―root out campus crime.‖ Erica Perez, Getting Booked by Facebook,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Oct. 3, 2007, at 1A.
102. Wilson, supra note 11, at 1225. Wilson notes that some of the heightened police concern
about this case may have been justifiable since the teen was a student in the same school district as
Columbine High School, where seven years earlier two students had killed thirteen people in a school
shooting spree. Id. at 1225 n.122.
103. Authorities appear to be using social networking photographs more frequently and for a
wide variety of purposes. User photographs may provide the basis for criminal charges. Wilson,
supra note 11, at 1225 (―[T]he Attorney General of Utah filed sexual-exploitation charges against a
twenty-seven-year-old man after investigators discovered a photo on his MySpace profile that
featured the man and two boys with whom he had been court-ordered not to have contact.‖). Or the
photographs may assist authorities in criminal investigations. Id. (noting a police detective who used
profile pictures of social networking users to create a lineup).
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socialize or to transmit information about parties and protests.‘‖104 Some
foreign police agencies, such as the United Kingdom‘s Greater Manchester
Police, have identified Facebook as such a useful tool that they have
established a permanent virtual presence on the web site.105
Traditional law enforcement agencies are not the only government actors
that have realized the investigative value of social networking. The Secret
Service has used information posted on the social web to investigate threats
against the President.106 The National Security Agency is currently funding
research intended to develop its capability to ―harvest‖ massive amounts of
social networking information.107 School administrators frequently reprimand
students who have posted information ―critical of professors, teachers, and
principals.‖108 Surveillance by school officials has become so prevalent,
MySpace has issued a document entitled ―The Official School
Administrator‘s Guide to Understanding MySpace and Resolving Social
Networking Issues.‖109
Thus, as both legitimate members and criminals use and abuse the social
networking structure provided by web sites, law enforcement will be
increasingly attracted to the user content posted on them. The use of posted
information by law enforcement and other government actors has
constitutional implications for the online social network phenomenon. More
specifically, when a government actor views a user‘s profile in an effort to
evaluate that user‘s ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of the
law, has a search occurred? That is the question this Comment seeks to
answer.
IV. MEASURING PRIVACY EXPECTATIONS IN ONLINE SOCIAL
NETWORKING CONTENT
Taking its command literally, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit
government searches and seizures, but requires only that they be conducted

104. Perez, supra note 101 (quoting Lisa Sprague, president-elect of the national group,
International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators).
105. Rich Bowden, UK Police First to Use Facebook, Tech Herald (Apr. 21, 2008),
http://www.thetechherald.com/article.php/200817/764/UK-police-first-to-use-Facebook (U.K. police
launched an application on Facebook to get information from the public regarding criminal cases).
106. Hodge, supra note 11, at 96.
107. Clemmitt, supra note 69, at 629. These federal surveillance programs are particularly
problematic for social networking users because they are often ―classified . . . and rarely subjected to
public scrutiny.‖ Patrick Marshall, Online Privacy, 19 C.Q. RESEARCHER 933, 947 (2009).
108. Hodge, supra note 11, at 96.
109. MySpace.com, The Official School Administrator‘s Guide to Understanding MySpace and
Resolving Social Networking Issues, http://cms.myspacecdn.com/cms/SafetySite/documents/
SchoolAdministratorGuide.pdf (last visited May 8, 2010).
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under reasonable circumstances.110 Ordinarily, a search is reasonable only if
police obtain a warrant prior to intruding upon the individual‘s privacy. 111
What constitutes a ―search‖ under the Amendment has, however, generated
much confusion and controversy as a result of the Supreme Court‘s
meandering Fourth Amendment doctrine.112 This places the police in the
difficult position of having to readily distinguish between those situations in
which a warrant is necessary and those in which it is not, with the
consequence being suppression of any evidence gained if officers guess
wrongly.113
Identifying which government intrusions constitute a search is rarely an
easy task, but it becomes increasingly difficult where technological
developments allow police to observe private conduct previously thought
inaccessible.
Although the Supreme Court has occasionally issued
pronouncements under these circumstances,114 it would be practically
impossible for the Court to establish rules governing each new advance in
technology.115 Thus, it will fall upon the lower courts to deal with rapid
technological shifts, but they ordinarily will do so within the mold of existing
110. The Fourth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that: ―The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated.‖ U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The ―seizure‖ portion of the Amendment is, as
constitutional provisions go, fairly straightforward and not the focus of this Comment. See 1 WAYNE
R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 2.1(a) (4th ed.
2008).
111. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (―[S]earches conducted outside
the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.‖)
(footnotes omitted).
112. See Kerr, supra note 6, at 503 (noting the Supreme Court has ―refused to provide a
consistent explanation for what makes an expectation of privacy ‗reasonable‘‖ and describing four
co-existing approaches used by the Court).
113. Cf. id. at 539 (noting police uncertainty where law regulating permissible investigative
techniques is in flux).
114. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29, 40 (2001) (holding that police use of a
thermal imaging device to scan a defendant‘s house for elevated heat signatures indicative of
marijuana growth lamps constituted a search). Further, even when the Supreme Court does speak on
Fourth Amendment privacy, its ―guidance tends to be very narrow.‖ Kerr, supra note 6, at 538–39
(noting that Kyllo did not establish a rule governing either devices not in general public use or senseenhancing devices directed at cars or people).
115. Some commentators have suggested this fact should compel deference to legislative
bodies, which possess greater institutional competence to respond to rapid technological shifts. See
Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for
Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 805, 857–82 (2004) (arguing that ―considerations of doctrine,
history, and function . . . teach that courts should place a thumb on the scale in favor of judicial
caution when technology is in flux, and should consider allowing legislatures to provide the primary
rules governing law enforcement investigations involving new technologies‖). But see Kerr, supra
note 6, at 533–34 (positive law may be enacted for reasons having nothing to do with the
reasonableness of police investigations and may inadequately deal with rapid technological changes).
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Supreme Court doctrine.116
A. Katz and the “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy” Test
Early efforts by the Court to adopt a rule distinguishing searches from
non-searches focused on the significance of physical intrusions into a person‘s
home or effects.117 Thus, courts primarily protected a citizen‘s ―spatial
privacy‖ and discouraged government actors from breaking down doors and
rummaging through personal belongings.118
This rule was generally sufficient until police began using increasingly
sophisticated technology—like wiretaps—that neither involved physical
trespass nor left the individual with any indication she was under surveillance.
The Court‘s first wiretap case, Olmstead v. United States, required the Court
to determine whether police interception of telephone conversations using
wiretaps placed outside a person‘s residence implicated the Fourth
Amendment.119 The issue placed the Court in a quandary. Abandoning a
physical intrusion requirement meant departing from the literal command of
the Fourth Amendment—which prevented unreasonable searches of ―persons,
houses, papers, and effects‖—and crafting a new, and almost assuredly more
amorphous, standard. Reaffirming the physical trespass standard was
probably equally unsatisfying, as it meant insulating new police practices and
investigative techniques from review by the courts.120
The Court rejected the defendants‘ arguments, adhered to the concept of
spacial privacy, and held police activity not involving physical intrusion did
not amount to a search. Justifying the Court‘s position in the text of the
Fourth Amendment, Chief Justice Taft, writing for the Court, drew back from
prior opinions suggesting the Amendment be given a broad reading:
Justice Bradley in the Boyd case, and Justice Clarke in the
Gouled case, said that the Fifth Amendment and the Fourth
Amendment were to be liberally construed to effect the
purpose of the framers of the Constitution in the interest of
liberty. But that [cannot] justify enlargement of the language
employed beyond the possible practical meaning of houses,
persons, papers, and effects, or so to apply the words search

116. Kerr, supra note 6, at 539, 545–49 (noting that the Supreme Court will leave most Fourth
Amendment matters to be resolved by lower courts, which will reason by analogy to prior cases).
117. Thomas K. Clancy, What Is a “Search” Within the Meaning of the Fourth Amendment?,
70 ALB. L. REV. 1, 4–7 (2006).
118. See Susan W. Brenner, The Fourth Amendment in an Era of Ubiquitous Technology, 75
MISS. L.J. 1, 7 (2005).
119. 277 U.S. 438, 455 (1928).
120. See Clancy, supra note 117, at 1–2.
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and seizure as to forbid hearing or sight.121
The Amendment‘s language, in the eyes of the Court, required that the
search ―be of material things—the person, the house, his papers or his
effects.‖122 The Court was not persuaded that the invention and widespread
use of the telephone demanded a different result.123 The Olmstead rule
prevailed for much of the twentieth century, during which police were
generally free to use new technology to their advantage without judicial
oversight.124
By the time the Supreme Court granted certiorari in United States v. Katz
in 1967, the continuing vitality of Olmstead was in serious doubt. That same
year, the Court decided Berger v. New York, in which the Court considered a
constitutional challenge to a statute authorizing eavesdropping conducted
pursuant to a warrant; in turn, the statute authorized issuance of a warrant
where authorities had ―reasonable ground to believe that evidence of crime
may be thus obtained.‖125 While the Court ultimately invalidated the statute
on the grounds that the statutory warrant process lacked constitutionally
required particularization,126 the Court also determined ―‗conversation‘ was
within the Fourth Amendment‘s protections, and that the use of electronic
devices to capture it was a ‗search‘ within the meaning of the Amendment.‖127
The Court recognized this holding as in direct conflict with Olmstead:
―Statements in [Olmstead] that a conversation passing over a telephone wire
cannot be said to come within the Fourth Amendment‘s enumeration of
‗persons, houses, papers, and effects‘ have been negated by our subsequent
cases. . . .‖128
Such was the state of the law when Katz came before the Court later that
year. During February 1965, police watched Charles Katz place daily calls
from a bank of three public telephone booths during certain times of the

121. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 465.
122. Id. at 464.
123. Id. at 465 (―The language of the Amendment [cannot] be extended and expanded to
include telephone wires reaching to the whole world from the defendant‘s house or office. The
intervening wires are not part of his house or office any more than are the highways along which they
are stretched.‖).
124. See Clancy, supra note 117, at 1–2; see also Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 135
(1942) (holding that the use of a detectaphone by government authorities was not a violation of the
Fourth Amendment). Although some states prohibited the use of wiretaps and ―bugs,‖ by and large
the practice of electronic eavesdropping was largely unregulated by state law or the Fourth
Amendment. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 47–49 (1967).
125. Berger, 388 U.S. at 54–55 (internal quotation marks omitted).
126. Id. at 55–56.
127. Id. at 51.
128. Id.
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day.129 Toward the end of February, police attached microphones and a
recorder to the tops of two booths and disabled the third.130 The microphones,
which did not physically penetrate the interior of the booths, captured only
Katz‘s end of the conversation, and police activated them only while Katz was
inside.131 Police recorded several incriminating statements suggesting Katz
was involved in a betting operation and were permitted to introduce those
statements at Katz‘s trial for violating a federal anti-wagering statute.132
The Court reversed Katz‘s conviction, concluding the government‘s
conduct constituted a warrantless search requiring suppression of the
evidence.133 The Supreme Court began the Katz opinion by rejecting the
Olmstead notion that the execution of a search hinged on whether the police
had invaded a ―constitutionally protected area.‖134 The Court leveled a
scathing rebuke against the attorneys for formulating the issue in such a
misleading manner, famously declaring ―the Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places.‖135 It explicitly overruled Olmstead, concluding ―the
underpinnings of Olmstead and Goldman have been so eroded by our
subsequent decisions that the ‗trespass‘ doctrine there enunciated can no
longer be regarded as controlling.‖136
The majority‘s conclusion was compelled by its recognition of the social
significance of the public telephone:
One who occupies [the telephone booth], shuts the door
behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call
is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into the
mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world. To read the
Constitution more narrowly is to ignore the vital role that the
public telephone has come to play in private
communication.137

129. Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130, 131 (9th Cir. 1966).
130. Id.
131. Id. Today, where electronic surveillance by law enforcement is increasingly common, the
process of reducing the amount of irrelevant information intercepted is known as ―minimization.‖
See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h) (2006).
132. Katz, 369 F.2d at 131–32.
133. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967).
134. Id. at 350.
135. Id. at 351. It was, of course, the Court itself that had formulated the issue precisely this
way in Olmstead, and it appears the Court‘s criticism is, at least with respect to Katz‘s attorney,
entirely unwarranted. See Peter Winn, Katz and the Origins of the “Reasonable Expectation of
Privacy” Test, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1, 9–10 (2009) (noting the petitioner‘s attorney, Harvey
Schneider, realized the Olmstead trespass standard was obsolete and focused on articulating a less
property-based test during oral argument).
136. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
137. Id. at 352.
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This ―celebrated but underappreciated discussion of the telephone
booth‖138 demonstrates a willingness on the part of the Court to analyze the
impact of its holding on the communicative practices of average citizens.139
The Court concluded protection was warranted for private communications—
even those occurring in a place accessible to the public.
Katz unquestionably expanded the coverage of the Fourth Amendment140
in a way suggesting virtual user content on social networking web sites should
be protected from warrantless police scrutiny. This is so even though, as in
Katz, some private communications may be seen or overheard by the public.
As did the public telephone, online social networking has revolutionized the
way individuals communicate. This is not to suggest our conception of
privacy must be redefined at the inception of each novel communicative
medium. As Justice Thomas recognized, however, online social networking
has fundamentally altered the balance between the public and the private in a
way that cannot be constitutionally ignored.141 To do so would ―ignore the
vital role‖ that online social networking has come to play in private
communications.142
Yet the Court‘s discussion of the social role of the public telephone has
not been Katz‘s lasting legacy. The majority‘s analysis was subtle, yet
complex, and subsequent courts have chosen to rely upon Justice Harlan‘s
concurring opinion for the applicable standard: ―My understanding of the rule
that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement,
first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy
and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize
as ‗reasonable.‘‖143 Justice Harlan‘s statement finds little support in the
Court‘s opinion,144 and ―came with a heavy thumb on the scale of law
enforcement,‖ as the following sections demonstrate.145

138. Jonathan Simon, Katz at Forty: A Sociological Jurisprudence Whose Time Has Come, 41
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 935, 945 (2008).
139. These consequences are discussed more thoroughly in Part V.
140. LAFAVE, supra note 110, § 2.1(b), at 384–85.
141. Justice Thomas, supra note 2.
142. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
143. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
144. The only statement of the majority arguably supporting such an approach comes near the
end of the Court‘s analysis, is stated in a conclusory fashion, and appears almost as an afterthought:
―The Government‘s activities in electronically listening to and recording the petitioner‘s words
violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus
constituted a ‗search and seizure‘ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.‖ Id. at 353.
145. Simon, supra note 138, at 953. This heavy thumb has not prevented the Court from
recognizing a privacy expectation in all instances. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34
(2001) (finding that the Fourth Amendment protects one from home searches conducted using
technology not in general public use).
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1. The Third-Party Doctrine
Online social networking is built upon a bedrock of voluntary disclosure.
To create a profile, a potential user must share some information about
himself. The user‘s ability to interact with others relies upon these initial
disclosures and that interaction encourages the user to volunteer additional
information.
Throughout this process, the user‘s information is
communicated to, and stored upon, the social networking web site‘s servers,
waiting to be accessed by an end user.146
Under current search doctrine, voluntary disclosure to third parties has a
dramatic effect upon the reasonableness of a citizen‘s privacy expectations. In
Smith v. Maryland,147 the Supreme Court held no search occurred when
officers installed a pen register on telephone company property that recorded
the numbers dialed from a telephone but did not disclose the content of
telephone conversations.148 This conclusion was premised upon the Court‘s
belief that ―people in general [do not] entertain any actual expectation of
privacy in the numbers they dial.‖149 This was so, reasoned the Court,
because telephone users had to convey the phone numbers to the telephone
company to complete the calls.150 Thus, because citizens expected the seized
information to be collected by the telephone companies anyway (after all, the
dialed numbers are listed on the phone bill), any privacy expectation in that
information was unreasonable.151 The simple act of disclosure to a third party
can destroy one‘s privacy expectations in shared non-content information.
The Smith dissenters, perhaps viewing the majority opinion as a
significant step back from Katz, offered a spirited defense of the defendant‘s
privacy rights. In Justice Stewart‘s view, the fact that the telephone company
recorded dialed numbers was irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment analysis, as
it did no more than describe ―the basic nature of telephone calls,‖ all of which
involve the use of telephone company property and payment for telephone
service.152
Justice Marshall launched a broader assault on the third-party doctrine,

146. Rich Miller, Facebook Now Has 30,000 Servers, Data Center Knowledge (Oct. 13, 2009),
http://www.datacenterknowledge.com/archives/2009/10/13/facebook-now-has-30000-servers.
Facebook operates an estimated 60,000 servers that perform more than 50 million operations per
second. Rich Miller, Facebook Server Count: 60,000 or More, Data Center Knowledge (June 28,
2010), http://www.datacenterknowledge.com/archives/2010/06/28/facebook-server-count-60000-ormore.
147. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
148. Id. at 745–46.
149. Id. at 742.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 746–48 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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announcing ―whether privacy expectations are legitimate within the meaning
of Katz depends not on the risks an individual can be presumed to accept
when imparting information to third parties, but on the risks he should be
forced to assume in a free and open society.‖153 To Justice Marshall, these
risks did not include the government‘s interception of non-content
information, for he noted (in language similar to that found in Katz) the ―vital
role telephonic communication plays in our personal and professional
relationships.‖154 Emphasizing the chilling effect unregulated government
monitoring would have on free speech and affiliation rights, Justice Marshall
concluded any scheme to intercept personal contact information should
receive the scrutiny of a neutral and detached magistrate prior to collection.155
The Supreme Court has never determined whether and how the third-party
doctrine applies to Internet communications,156 and the dissenters‘ views may
yet carry the day. It is difficult to draw the line required by Smith; if
disclosure to a third party eliminates a caller‘s privacy expectation in noncontent information, why should a caller possess a reasonable privacy
expectation in the content of her conversation? In both instances, the
telephone company acts as a conduit between the caller and the recipient. The
distinction between content and non-content information breaks down even
further on the Internet, where ―[u]sers disclose both content and routing
information, in exactly the same technical manner, to an enormous number of
third parties.‖157 This fact may be sufficient to motivate a majority of the
Court to adopt the dissenters‘ position, particularly where social networking
information is concerned, because every piece of information posted to a
social networking web site like Facebook is stored on third parties‘ servers as
well, just waiting to be retrieved.158 Moreover, this information is not simply
stored for the convenience of the web site user; instead, the web site operators
collect revenue by using this information to display ads tailored to the user‘s
particular interests. As one commentator succinctly put it, ―[t]he only way
that Smith‘s reasoning based on third-party disclosure could make sense in the
Internet age would be an undesirable (and likely factually inaccurate) holding
that people have no expectation of any privacy in their Internet
153. Id. at 750 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 751.
155. Id. Justice Marshall displayed incredible foresight; police scrutiny of a user‘s online
social networking content creates substantial tension with the First Amendment‘s guarantee of
freedom of association. See Katherine J. Strandburg, Freedom of Association in a Networked World:
First Amendment Regulation of Relational Surveillance, 49 B.C. L. REV. 741, 783–86 (2008); infra
notes 218–225 and accompanying text.
156. Robert Ditzion, Note, Electronic Surveillance in the Internet Age: The Strange Case of
Pen Registers, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1321, 1334 (2004).
157. Id. at 1336.
158. See Miller, supra note 146.
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communications.‖159
Courts and lawyers may struggle to fit social networking information
within Smith‘s content/non-content framework, but this framework will
remain the focus of analysis in the absence of guidance from the Supreme
Court. Recent cases reaffirm the continuing vitality of the content/noncontent distinction fundamental to Smith. In a highly criticized decision, the
Ninth Circuit recently extended the third-party doctrine to sanction
government interception of the ―to‖ and ―from‖ addresses of e-mail messages,
IP addresses of web sites visited, and the total volume of data used by an
account.160 This information was unprotected, according to the Forrester
court, because users ―should know that [the to/from addresses of their e-mail
messages and IP addresses of the web sites they visit are] provided to and
used by Internet service providers for the specific purpose of directing the
routing of information.‖161 Yet the court emphasized the fact that the
government was accessing neither the content of the e-mails nor particular
web pages on the web sites the person viewed. ―At best, the government may
make educated guesses about what was said in the messages or viewed on the
websites based on its knowledge of the e-mail to/from addresses,‖ but the
court found this ―no different from speculation about the contents of a phone
conversation on the basis of the identity of the person . . . dialed.‖162
The courts‘ continuing commitment to distinguishing between content and
non-content data means social networking information must be classified in
one category or the other. In contrast to Smith and Forrester, police
interception of user social networking information involves seizure of content,
not mere address or routing data. When police observe a user‘s online
pictures or messages, they are observing the type of information that typically
would be transmitted in a telephone or e-mail conversation. In other words,
profile content is not mere ―routing‖ information. The Fourth Amendment
generally protects individuals from warrantless government seizure of their
substantive information. In United States v. Maxwell, for example, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces determined ―that the transmitter of an
e-mail message enjoys a reasonable expectation that police officials will not
intercept the transmission without probable cause and a search warrant.‖163
Recognition of a privacy expectation in this type of information does not
totally insulate the information from police scrutiny. Courts have uniformly
159. Ditzion, supra note 156, at 1336.
160. United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 418 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (analogizing an e-mail to a
letter). The court went on to note that no constitutional issue is created when the recipient of that
e-mail directs it to police. Id. at 417–19.
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held no privacy expectation inheres in subscriber information submitted to
Internet service providers and obtained by police through the legal process.164
The privacy policies of both MySpace and Facebook indicate those services
will make required disclosures of user information to comply with court
orders or subpoenas.165
That online social networking content may be protected under the thirdparty doctrine does not completely resolve the question. What do we make of
the fact that much virtual user content is publicly accessible without a warrant
or compulsory legal action directed toward the third-party web site? What are
the Fourth Amendment implications of a user‘s failure to adequately
safeguard her online information—by, for example, adjusting privacy controls
to a more restrictive setting? Are police free to obtain a user‘s registration
information, which users are now generally required to make public?
2. The Public Vantage Doctrine
Stated simply, the public vantage doctrine provides that no Fourth
Amendment search has occurred where a law enforcement officer perceives
evidence from a lawful vantage point through the use of the officer‘s
senses.166 Though this observation by itself does not give the officer
justification to seize the evidence immediately in the absence of some valid
exception to the warrant requirement,167 the doctrine is a powerful tool that
permits police to establish probable cause supporting a warrant. The doctrine
acts as a boundary limiting the reasonableness of one‘s privacy expectation
based upon the incriminating object‘s degree of exposure to the public at
large. The public vantage doctrine maintains a tight relationship with the Katz
test, for even in that decision the Supreme Court noted that ―[w]hat a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a

164. See, e.g., Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 335–36 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Hambrick,
55 F. Supp. 2d 504, 507 (W.D. Va. 1999), aff’d 225 F.3d 656 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v.
Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1110 (D. Kan. 2000).
165. Facebook.com, Facebook‘s Privacy Policy, supra note 19 (―We may disclose information
pursuant to subpoenas, court orders, or other requests (including criminal and civil matters) if we
have a good faith belief that the response is required by law.‖); MySpace.com, Privacy Policy, supra
note 24 (―MySpace may access or disclose [personally identifiable information], Profile Information
or non-[personally identifiable information] without providing you a choice in order to . . . comply
with the law or legal process.‖).
166. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449–50 (1989) (plurality opinion).
167. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 110, § 2.2(a), at 399–400 (right of seizure does not flow
automatically from the plain view); see also Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 738 (1983) (noting the
―‗plain view‘ [doctrine] provides grounds for seizure of an item when an officer‘s access to an object
has some prior [Fourth Amendment] justification‖). Thus, unlike the public vantage doctrine, the
plain view doctrine permits seizure of the item observed because it is ―not . . . an independent
‗exception‘ to the Warrant Clause, but simply . . . an extension of whatever the prior justification for
an officer‘s ‗access to an object‘ may be.‖ Brown, 460 U.S. at 738–39.
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subject of Fourth Amendment protection.‖168
The breadth of the public vantage doctrine is illustrated by decisions such
as California v. Ciraolo169 and Florida v. Riley.170 In Ciraolo, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to determine whether warrantless aerial observation
of a fenced-in backyard from an altitude of 1,000 feet violated the Fourth
Amendment.171 Police officers responding to an anonymous report of
marijuana growth in the respondent‘s backyard were frustrated upon
discovering two layers of fencing as high as ten feet obstructing their view.172
As a result, two officers trained in marijuana identification secured a private
plane and flew over the house.173 They observed and photographed marijuana
vegetation, obtained a search warrant, and seized seventy-three marijuana
plants.174
The Court, applying Justice Harlan‘s formulation of the Katz test,
concluded the defendant‘s expectation of privacy in the contents of his
backyard was not reasonable because ―[a]ny member of the public flying in
this airspace who glanced down could have seen everything that these officers
observed.‖175 Though the Court declined to determine whether the defendant
exhibited a subjective expectation by constructing the ten-foot fence
(laughably speculating the backyard may have been visible to ―a citizen or a
policeman perched on the top of a truck or a two-level bus‖),176 the mere
possibility of public access, however implausible, was sufficient to defeat the
asserted privacy interest. Not surprisingly, the majority‘s discussion
engendered a few jeers from the four dissenting Justices, who maintained that
the Court disregarded the ―qualitative difference‖ between police surveillance
and public use of the airspace for business or pleasure.177
In Riley, the Court considered ―‗[w]hether surveillance of the interior of a
partially covered greenhouse in a residential backyard from the vantage point
of a helicopter located 400 feet above the greenhouse constitutes a ―search‖
for which a warrant is required under the Fourth Amendment.‘‖178 Florida
law enforcement officials had received a tip that marijuana was being grown
inside the greenhouse and circled twice above the greenhouse in a helicopter
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
476 U.S. 207 (1986).
488 U.S. 445 (1989) (plurality opinion).
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 209.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 209–10.
Id. at 213–14.
Id. at 211–12.
Id. at 224–25 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 447–48 (1989).
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in an attempt to observe its contents. The officials correctly identified
marijuana plants within the confines of the greenhouse, but were met with a
motion to suppress the evidence because the flyover allegedly violated the
defendant‘s Fourth Amendment rights.179
Concluding that Ciraolo compelled the Court‘s decision, Justice White
authored a plurality opinion in which four Justices concluded the defendant
―could not reasonably have expected that his greenhouse was protected from
public or official observation from a helicopter had it been flying within the
navigable airspace for [a] fixed-wing aircraft.‖180 Just as in Ciraolo, this
holding again turned upon the degree to which the defendant had exposed the
evidence observed by the officials to the public.181 Justice White extensively
cited Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations to support his
position, arguing there was no bar on helicopter traffic at the height at which
the police helicopter was traveling.182
Justice O‘Connor concurred in the judgment and provided the fifth vote
for affirming the defendant‘s conviction, but took pains to make clear that in
her view ―[t]he fact that a helicopter could conceivably observe the curtilage
at virtually any altitude or angle, without violating FAA regulations, does not
in itself mean that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy from
such observation.‖183 Rather, Justice O‘Connor focused on ―whether the
helicopter was in the public airways at an altitude at which members of the
public travel with sufficient regularity that Riley‘s expectation of privacy from
aerial observation was not ‗one that society is prepared to recognize as
‗reasonable.‘‖184 Justice O‘Connor concluded that the defendant had not met
the burden to prove a search had occurred because he had introduced no
evidence showing the public did not use that airspace.185
The public vantage doctrine is a powerful tool for the government, and at
least one court has used it to preclude tort recovery for privacy invasion
stemming from the publication of a social networking user‘s profile content.186
In Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, Inc., the plaintiff, Cynthia Moreno, wrote a
poem disparaging her hometown and published it to her MySpace page.187
Although she removed the poem six days later, she was too late; the principal of
179. Id. at 448–49.
180. Id. at 450–51.
181. ―Any member of the public could legally have been flying over Riley‘s property in a
helicopter at the altitude of 400 feet and could have observed Riley‘s greenhouse.‖ Id. at 451.
182. Id. at 451 n.3.
183. Id. at 454 (O‘Connor, J., concurring).
184. Id. (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)).
185. Id. at 455 (O‘Connor, J., concurring).
186. Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, Inc., 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 858 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).
187. Id. at 861.
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a local high school submitted the poem to a local newspaper, which published it
and attributed it to Cynthia.188 In her suit against the newspaper, Cynthia
argued the publication was a tortious violation of her privacy rights. Although
the court acknowledged ―‗[i]nformation disclosed to a few people may remain
private[,]‘‖189 it reasoned that ―[b]y posting the article on myspace.com,
Cynthia opened the article to the public at large.‖190 ―Under these
circumstances,‖ the court stated, ―no reasonable person would have an
expectation of privacy regarding the published material.‖191
Courts have reached similar conclusions in cases concerning public ―chat
rooms‖ or electronic bulletin boards in which users may virtually converse
with one another and oftentimes share images or documents as well.
―Messages sent to the public at large in the ‗chat room‘ or e-mail that is
‗forwarded‘ from correspondent to correspondent lose any semblance of
privacy,‖ declared the Maxwell court.192 In Guest v. Leis, the court found no
violation of the Fourth Amendment where government officers assumed
undercover identities, accessed an electronic bulletin board, and downloaded
sample images, because ―[u]sers would logically lack a legitimate expectation
of privacy in the materials intended for publication or public posting.‖193
At first blush, the public vantage doctrine appears to doom any asserted
privacy expectation in public social networking content. Since authorities
may be lawfully present in any space open to the public, nothing prevents
police from patrolling web sites as they would a public street without first
obtaining a warrant. This means a great deal of user information could be
viewed by government officials, since many users never adopt more
restrictive privacy settings. Even where a sophisticated user has done so, a
significant amount of information remains publicly accessible—on Facebook,
for example, this includes a user‘s name, profile photo, gender, and
networks.194
This is not an obvious result. While a chat room or electronic bulletin
board user might intend to broadcast his or her messages to the world at large,
this is increasingly not true of social networking users. Privacy settings
188. Id.
189. Id. at 863 (quoting M.G. v. Time Warner, Inc., 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 504, 511 (Cal. Ct. App.
2001)).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 862.
192. United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 419 (C.A.A.F. 1996). The court suggested that as
the number of recipients increases, the sender‘s privacy expectations decrease. Id. This discussion
may simply reflect that as the number of recipients increases, so too does the risk that one or more of
the recipients will communicate with the police.
193. 255 F.3d 325, 333 (6th Cir. 2001).
194. Facebook.com, Facebook‘s Privacy Policy, supra note 19, § 3; see also Richmond, supra
note 8.
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remain an advanced feature of social networking web sites, and their
modification requires some degree of user sophistication. Thus, many users
who may not wish to share profile content with the public nonetheless do so
because they lack sufficient knowledge of the web site‘s operation to
effectively change these settings and accomplish the desired restrictions.
Recent social science data underscore the extent to which users may be
unaware that their profile information is public. A January 2009 study found
that 42% of sampled MySpace users between the ages of eighteen and twenty
who displayed risk behaviors changed their profiles within a month of being
informed their profiles were publicly viewable.195 This finding is consistent
with the observation that many Internet users simply do not possess, and do
not feel that they need to obtain, an in-depth understanding of a social
networking web site‘s operation to fully utilize it. For most users, it is
sufficient that they know how to create a profile and virtually socialize. The
web sites have also contributed to the diminishing need for this knowledge by
developing fast and easy sign-up processes and encouraging mobile use.196
Indeed, setting up a profile is ―so easy that, quite literally, a child could do
it.‖197
The intent to publish normally inferred from the use of a public electronic
bulletin board or chat room cannot be inferred from the use of social
networking web sites. Even those users who are aware of the web site‘s
privacy settings and possess the technical competence necessary to achieve
the desired level of privacy may wish to leave the settings in their default
state. This does not necessarily demonstrate an intention to publish profile
content to the world at large, but for these users more likely reflects a
recognition that restrictive privacy settings are somewhat inconsistent with the
purpose of online social networking in the first instance. A user must allow
some degree of access to her profile if she intends to meet other members
through the web site. To the extent privacy restrictions impair the members‘
ability to fully utilize social networking services, they defeat one of the

195. Erica Perez, Many Teens Divulge Risk Behaviors Online, Study Says, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Jan. 7, 2009, at 1B (citing Moreno et al., supra note 62). The authors of the study
conceded that they could not ―determine the active ingredient of the intervention with certainty[,]‖
but acknowledged that one mechanism through which the intervention may have affected the
removal decision ―is that by reading our e-mail message, adolescents may have realized how publicly
available their [social networking] profiles have become.‖ Moreno et al., supra note 62, at 39.
196. See Abril, supra note 13, at 74; Guo, supra note 13, at 620; see also Adam M. Gershowitz,
The iPhone Meets the Fourth Amendment, 56 UCLA L. REV. 27, 43 (2008) (noting police seizure of
a person‘s cell phone may expose social networking content that ―might be rich sources of
incriminating information‖).
197. Sasha Leonhardt, The Future of “Fair and Balanced”: The Fairness Doctrine, Net
Neutrality, and the Internet, 2009 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 8, ¶ 27,
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/2009dltr008.html.
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principal functions of these web sites.198
Application of the public vantage doctrine rests, of course, upon the user‘s
profile being publicly accessible. The doctrine has no application where a
user has modified her privacy settings to restrict access to content.199 What
result should occur where a user has demonstrated a subjective intention to
shield online information from prying eyes by limiting disclosure to
friends?200
3. The Misplaced Confidences Doctrine
If a user has taken affirmative steps to limit profile access, a police
observer‘s attempts to access most potentially incriminating information will
be frustrated. Rarely has an officer‘s initial lack of success at gaining access
to incriminating information ended the matter. In the social networking
context, authorities have two ways to obtain information about a user if they
find his profile restricted.
First, a police officer may create a profile and convince the targeted user
to add her as a friend. The officer may create a legitimate profile in hopes that
the user indiscriminately accepts friend requests, or may adopt a technique
popular among chat room investigators and create an alternate persona—
perhaps a fictional person who shares many of the user‘s publicly observable
characteristics.
In the alternative, the officer may use publicly available information to
seek out individuals whom the officer believes the user has befriended
online.201 Nothing prevents police from obtaining incriminating information
directly from these virtual friends, who have access to the suspect‘s profile
content by virtue of their online connection.
Both methods are permissible according to the misplaced confidences
doctrine, a slight variation of the third-party doctrine that traces its roots to
Hoffa v. United States.202 In Hoffa, an informant accompanying James Hoffa
throughout his trial for violations of the Taft-Hartley Act reported to federal

198. See Hodge, supra note 11, at 116 ( ―[U]sers sign up to connect to friends and give these
friends their information.‖). As another commentator has noted, ―voluntary disclosure of personal
information and gossip about others are sources of intimacy and lead to healthy interpersonal
relations.‖ Abril, supra note 13, at 85.
199. This is not true if profile sections that always remain public contain the incriminating
information.
200. This proposition is consistent with another commentator‘s conclusion about the Fourth
Amendment‘s application to a limited online social networking profile. See Hodge, supra note 11, at
115–16.
201. Note this investigative method may not be permissible if the public vantage doctrine does
not apply to social networking information. See supra notes 194–198 and accompanying text.
202. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
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agents conversations in which Hoffa discussed bribing members of the jury.203
Responding to Hoffa‘s contention that the government‘s use of an informant
violated the Fourth Amendment, the Court noted Hoffa merely relied upon his
―misplaced confidence‖ that those with whom Hoffa was conversing would
not reveal his wrongdoing.204 In the Court‘s view, the Fourth Amendment
does not protect ―a wrongdoer‘s misplaced belief that a person to whom he
voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it.‖205
The seminal misplaced confidences case is United States v. Miller,206 in
which the government obtained Miller‘s financial information from banks,
pursuant to defective subpoenas, and used it to convict him of defrauding the
United States of tax revenue.207 Miller challenged the evidence, arguing the
documents were illegally seized in violation of his Fourth Amendment
rights.208 The Supreme Court upheld Miller‘s conviction, concluding Miller
possessed no protectable privacy interest in the bank documents because, once
shared with the bank, the account records were not Miller‘s ―private
papers.‖209 Citing the old Katz law that ―[w]hat a person knowingly exposes
to the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection,‖210 the
Court noted ―[a]ll of the documents obtained, including financial statements
and deposit slips, contain only information voluntarily conveyed to the banks
and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business.‖211 From
this, it reasoned:
The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to
another, that the information will be conveyed by that person
to the Government. This Court has held repeatedly that the
Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of
information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to
Government authorities, even if the information is revealed
on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited
purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not
be betrayed.212
This rule does not operate differently when the evidence in question is
derived from electronic communications, rather than from in-person
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Id. at 294–95.
Id. at 302.
Id.
425 U.S. 435 (1976).
Id. at 436.
Id. at 437.
Id. at 440–41.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
Miller, 425 U.S. at 442.
Id. at 443 (citations omitted).
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conversations. The misplaced confidences doctrine has been applied to dispel
asserted privacy expectations in e-mail213 and chat room conversations.214
Indeed, where disclosure to the government occurs through the recipient, the
communicator‘s privacy expectation in the content of the communication
generally will be defeated, regardless of the medium used.
While the misplaced confidences doctrine is a fairly straightforward rule,
it has serious implications for a social networking user‘s privacy. Unlike the
third-party doctrine, it permits government officials to obtain user content
without legal compulsion. The only way a user may protect his content from
this type of disclosure is by carefully selecting which friends he adds. This is,
of course, easy to preach but difficult to practice. Online social networks are
designed to share information among large groups, and individuals who
request another‘s virtual friendship and are rejected may feel slighted. It is
often easier for users to accept all friend requests, or all those in a particular
group (say, coworkers), than to pick and choose whom to add and whom to
reject. As the Maxwell court recognized, there is a direct relationship between
the number of recipients and the risk that one or more of them will use the
information (be it a photograph, video, or status update) in a way harmful to
the communicator.215
V. THE IMPORTANCE OF PROTECTION FOR ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORKING
USER CONTENT
Although application of the Court‘s search jurisprudence to new
communicative technology presents difficult questions, there is little doubt
courts will be called upon to provide answers as online social networking
becomes more prevalent. As the foregoing discussion has demonstrated, the
Court‘s current Fourth Amendment doctrines suggest a user might maintain a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his online profile content unless he
misplaces confidence in a virtual friend who reveals incriminating content to
authorities. This is by no means a clear result, and, in this Part, I wish to
highlight two practical consequences of the refusal to extend Fourth
Amendment protection to online social networking content.
First, non-recognition of privacy expectations in online social networking
content threatens to erode protection for a wide range of commonly disclosed
information. In Kyllo v. United States, the Court suggested technology can
indeed ―shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy.‖216 Although the Court held
213. Commonwealth v. Proetto, 771 A.2d 823, 831 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001); United States v.
Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 417 (C.A.A.F. 1996).
214. Proetto, 771 A.2d at 832; United States v. Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. 1177, 1178–79
(S.D. Ohio 1997).
215. Maxwell, 45 M.J. at 419.
216. 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
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that a ―search‖ occurred when law enforcement officers scanned the
defendant‘s home using thermal imaging systems in an attempt to identify
warmer portions that might house high-intensity lamps used for growing
marijuana,217 the fact that thermal imaging technology was not in use by the
general public was critical to the Court‘s analysis.218
The Court‘s analysis suggests information revealed by publicly used
technology is not entitled to Fourth Amendment protection. Online social
networking has already become a practice widely embraced by the masses,
and many individuals apparently have little reservation displaying intimate
details of their lives on a Facebook profile. This includes a great deal of
information many individuals in our society would deem private, including
one‘s sexual preferences or favorite books. If the court‘s ―general public use‖
analysis is to have future significance (and it is not clear it will), privacy
expectations in this type of information may be unreasonable in the future.
Given the staggering growth rates of social networking web sites, this
prediction may not be all that far-fetched.
Unregulated police surveillance of social networking users also potentially
burdens the exercise of well-established constitutional rights. ―[T]he Court
has recognized a right to associate for the purpose of engaging in those
activities protected by the First Amendment—speech, assembly, petition for
the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion.‖219 ―This right is
crucial in preventing the majority from imposing its views on groups that
would rather express other, perhaps unpopular, ideas.‖220 Further, an
individual‘s choice to ―enter into and maintain certain intimate human
relationships‖ is a ―fundamental element of personal liberty‖ protected against
encroachment by the state.221 Indeed, government action infringing these
expressive associations must serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the
suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through ―means significantly
less restrictive of associational freedoms.‖222
Police scrutiny of social networking web sites threatens to undermine
these associational interests ―by providing the government with means to
obtain information about group membership.‖223 Information collection
217. Id. at 29.
218. Id. at 34.
219. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984); see also Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S.
51, 56–57 (1973) (―There can no longer be any doubt that freedom to associate with others for the
common advancement of political beliefs and ideas is a form of ‗orderly group activity‘ protected by
the First and Fourteenth Amendments.‖).
220. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647–48 (2000).
221. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617–18.
222. Id. at 623.
223. See Strandburg, supra note 155, at 769.
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―impairs expressive activity not directly through regulation, but indirectly
through deterrence.‖224
Thus, unrestrained police scrutiny of social
networking web sites threatens to chill the formation of protected associations
in several ways: by disclosing their existence and membership, by creating the
potential for legitimate associations to be unfairly scrutinized, and by the risk
that some individuals will be treated as a member of a group to which they did
not wish to be associated.225 Viewing the Fourth Amendment through this
―special First Amendment lens‖ provides additional support for crediting an
individual‘s asserted privacy expectation in online social networking
content.226
VI. CONCLUSION
The brave new technological world envisioned by Justice Thomas, and the
corresponding merger of the public and private spheres, creates difficult
constitutional questions. As social networking services grow in popularity,
they will be frequently utilized by authorities to gather information and pursue
criminal investigations. While existing Fourth Amendment doctrine, built
around envelopes and telephones, is difficult to apply in these circumstances,
the analogy suggests police must first obtain a warrant before scrutinizing
online profile content, unless acting pursuant to the misplaced confidences
doctrine. In addition to preserving user associational freedoms and non-user
privacy interests, this result has the added benefit of restoring significance to
Katz‘s recognition that the role of technology in facilitating communication is
important.
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